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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

VINCENT L. BELGARD,

Case No. 15743

Defendant-Appellant

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Automobile Homicide,
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207
(1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E.
Banks, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, VINCENT L. BELGARD, was charged by Information
with the offense of Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as
amended) (T.6, Vol. II).

On

November 17, 1977, the appellant

was convicted by a jury of the offense charged in the
Information.

On March 17, 1978, the appellant was sentenced

by the above entitled court, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge

presiding, to zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.
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Appellant has previously filed a brief in this matter without
reply from respondent and offers this Supplemental Brief
on Appeal raising an additional and it is urged dispositive
issue.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, VINCENT L, BELGARD, seeks reversal of the
judgment of guilt entered against him and a remand of the
instant case to the trial court for new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant submits the Statement of the Facts offered in

1

the original Brief of Appellant submitted in the instant
case.
ARGUMENT
POINT IV
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THAT AN ELEMENT
OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE WAS NEGLIGENCE AND THE COURT
PROPERLY SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE IS REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A CHARGE OF
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE.
Appellant was charged in one count of the Information with
Automobile Homicide.

Appellant contends that the court

erroneously instructed the jury in the elements of automobile
homicide because the court instructed the jury that simple
negligence was all that the State needed to prove and appellant
contends that criminal negligence is a necessary element of
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any homicide offense in the State of Utah.
The recent decision of this Court in State of Utah v.
Johnny M. Chavez, Utah

P. 2d _ _ (no. 16132 Filed 12-31- 79)

is dispositive of this issue and mandates reversal of appellant's
conviction of Automobile Homicide and remand to the district
court for new trial.
In Chavez this court reversed its previous rulings in
State v. Durrant, Utah, 561 P.2d 1056 (1977), State v. Anderson,
Utah, 561 P.2d 1061 (1977) and State v. Wade, Utah 472 P.2d
398 (1977) and held that an instruction in an Automobile
Homicide prosecution which defined "negligence" in simple
negligence tenns was error mandating reversal and new trial.
In the case at bar the trial Court in Instruction No.
25 (R. 72) defined automobile homicide as defined in Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as amended) and said that it was sufficient
if a person caused the death of another by operating a vehicle
in a negligent manner.

The Court in Instruction No. 26

(R.73) also used in paragraph 3 the term simple negligence
as the element.

Negligence was defined by the Court in

-3-
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Instruction No. 21 (R. ~) .

1

Appellant excepted to the giving

of those instructions on the basis that criminal negligence
was necessary.

Appellant offered instructions which defined

automobile homicide and required criminal negligence and set out·
the elements of automobile homicide, one of those elements
being criminal negligence rather than simple negligence.
Appellant's proposed Instruction No. 7 (R.9.J). 2
The Court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 22 that
any speed in excess of the posted speed limit would be
sufficient evidence to permit a finding of negligence (R. 69) _J '

1.

Instruction no. 21:

"Negligence is the failure to do 'Nhat a reasonable and prudent person
would have done under the circunstances or doing 'Nhat such person under such
circunstances ~d not have done. The fault may lie in acting or in
comnitting to.act.

1

2. Appellant's proposed Instruction on Criminal Negligence was taken fron
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 (1953 as a!IEilded) and stated in its entirety.
As used in these instructions negligence is defined with respect to
circunstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his a:mduct men he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the cirCtlll'ltan~
exist or the result will occur. The risk nust be of such a nature and degree
tJhat the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standari
of care that an ordinary person .vould exercise in all the circUIBtances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.

3.

In its entirety this instruction stated:

It is the duty of a driver to operate his autorrobile at a speed that~
safe, reasonable and prudent under the circurrstances, with due regard to the
surface and width of the roadway, the traffic thereon, and any actua~ or tooeO:
potential hazards then existing. Failure of the driver to operate ~s au :1
in accordance with the foregoing requirerrents of the law .vould constitute negW
on his part .
50 mile
The legal speed limit for the place in question in this case was endiilg
per hour. This rreans only that in the absence of any special hazards t b
to make such a speed limit unsafe, then the speed limit indicated should ~
5
regarded as reasonable and lawful under ordinary circurrstancei;; .. But H!fY ce
in excess of such indicated speed limit .vould constitute sufficient eviden
to permit a finding of negligence.
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And, in Instruction No. 23 (R. 70) the Court instructed the jury
that failure of a driver to obey a traffic control device
would constitute "negligence" (R . .Z.Q)~
Appellant Instruction No. 7 was not submitted to the jury
even though as in Chavez it defined negligence in terms of
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1953 as amended).
Appellant's contention at the time of trial and now
is that under our statutes no offense is a criminal offense unless
a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with
criminal negligence or his act constitutes an offense involving
strict liability.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101 (1953 as amended).

Further, appellant was charged with a form of criminal
homicide and our statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-201 (1953 as
amended) provides that a person connnits criminal homicide
if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence unlawfully causes the death of another.

Criminal

Homicide is defined as murder in the first and second degree,
manslaughter, or negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.
Appellant was fully aware that this argument was made and
4. This instruction in its entirety stated:
If you find that a driver of a vehicle failed to obey t:i:ie ~tructions
of a traffic-control signal at an intersection where ~ traffic :-S. oontrolled
by a traffic-control signal, such a finding would constitute suf~cient
evidence to permit a finding of "negligent" as stated elsewhere in
these instructions.
A traffic-control signal includes any device, ~ether manually!
electrically, or rrechanically operated by which traffic alternately directed
to stop and to proceed.
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rejected by this Court in three previous cases, St a t e v.

Du~

561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1977), State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398 (Utah lln
and State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977).

Appellant

contended however that the opinions in those cases are and were
erroneous and the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan
in State v. Durant, supra was the correct law in the State of
Utah, and should have been adopted by this Court and the above
three cited cases shoulJd be overruled based upon reasoning set
forth by Justice Maughan.
Appellant saw his argument adopted in Chavez and his
case also demands reversal and remand for retrial in accordance
with the Chavez opinion.
The appellant, Belgard, was charged with events arising
on July 28, 1977 (Brief of Appellant at 2).

Johnny Chavez

was charged with events arising on July 21, 1977 (Brief of
Appellant State of Utah v. Johnny Chavez Case No. 16132 at 1).

The appellant-Belgard was convicted after trial on November 17, 11
and Johnny Chavez was convicted after trial on March 29, 1978.
Under the facts of this case where appellant was found
guilty of automobile homicide, it is apparent that the jury
found appellant to be negligent in his driving pattern otherwise
appellant could not have been found guilty.

However, had the

jury been properly instructed that he must have acted with
criminal negligence, using the definition of criminal negligence
the jury may not have found that the risk taken by appellant
was of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it
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(namely the red light) constituted a gross deviation frGm
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circtIDlstances as viewed from appellant's standpoint.
The clear difference between negligence and criminal negligence
could easily have made a vast difference in the outcome of this
case.
The statement of Justice Wilkins writing for the majority
in Chavez applies equally to appellant-Belgard.
We are therefore of the opinion that our previous
cases holding that automobile homicide requires
only proof of simple negligence under §76-5-207 are
in error, and are overruled. And we hold that a
conviction of automobile homicide requires an
instruction on criminal negligence as that term
is defined in §76-2-103(4), and a determination
thereof by the jury. As the Court's Instruction
18 defined simple negligence and not criminal
negligence, defendant is entitled to a new trial.
(State of Utah v. Johnny Chavez, Utah Supreme Court
Case No. 16132 Advance Slip Opinion at 4.)
For the above stated reason appellant requests reversal
of his conviction for Automobile Homicide and remand to the
Third Judicial District Court for new trial.
Respectfully submitted

~~
this~

day of February, 1980.

DJ. YENGICH
ell and Yengich
Atto eys at Law
44 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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